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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Many scholars discuss a “constitutionalization” of international law.1 Some 
look for a document or set of documents that can be the “constitution” in this 
constitutionalizing or constitutionalized system.2 Common candidates include 
the Charter of the United Nations (Charter),3 all or parts of the “International 
Bill of Rights” (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 
International Covenant on Cultural, Social, and Economic Rights (ICESCR)),4 
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).5 Comparisons 
between international law and domestic constitutional orders help determine 
whether this process of constitutionalization is taking place or complete.6 Some 
domestic courts use international law to decide cases and understand legal 
phenomena.7 Some conduct constitutional comparisons to decide cases.8 These 
phenomena combine to raise an intriguing question: To what extent can the kinds 
of comparisons between the international legal order and domestic constitutional 
legal orders that have provided information about international law and the 
constitutionalization thereof now shed light on domestic constitutional laws? 
This Article provides a response. It proposes caution in conducting such 
comparisons to address constitutional issues and argues that at least most valid 
comparisons to fulfill constitutional law purposes likely do not qualify as forms 
of comparative constitutional law but are instead examples of other kinds of 
(often clearly useful) analysis. “Constitutional” comparisons to decide 
constitutional cases in one’s state are legitimate where the foreign legal order is 
sufficiently similar to one’s domestic constitutional legal order such that we can 
 
 
 
1 See, e.g., RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) [hereinafter RULING THE WORLD]; 
JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2009). 
2 Blaine Sloan, The United Nations Charter as a Constitution, 1 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 61, 62 (1989); 
See also, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations 
Revisited, 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 19 (1997); Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as 
Constitution of The International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L LAW 529, 558, 567, 593, 618 
(1998); Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 749, 759 
(2008).  
3 U.N. Charter art. 102. On its candidacy see Sloan, supra note 2, at 61; Dupuy, supra note 2, at 12; 
CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, THE UNITED NATIONS AT AGE FIFTY: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE IX (Kluwer Law 
Int’l 1995) [hereinafter Tomuschat]. 
4 G.A. Res. 217 (III) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. On the status and joint candidacy of this “International Bill of Rights,” see 
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 750. 
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
On its candidacy (and that of other documents), See KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 
23–25. 
6 RULING THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 18. See also, Sloan, supra note 2, at 63. 
7 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999) 2 S.C.R. 817, 47 (Can.) (see 
para. 70 for other transnational case law). Some courts are bound to use it. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 
1996, § 39(1)(b). 
8 See, e.g., THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 5–10 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006) [hereinafter 
Choudhry]. 
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plausibly understand the foreign legal order as constitutional and capable of 
providing insight into the nature of constitutions, constitutionalism, and 
constitutional phenomena. Yet, there is reason to question whether the 
international legal order has enough features of domestic constitutional orders 
to justify this form of judicial comparison between the international legal order 
and domestic constitutional orders. The ongoing constitutionalization process is 
unlikely to produce an international legal order with sufficiently similar features 
to domestic constitutional orders. To make this clear, I address the case of a 
Charter-based international “constitutional” order. I explore whether the Charter 
is an international constitution and whether the system that it anchors is a 
constitutional legal order, providing negative responses to both inquiries. I 
further detail other reasons to question whether any international legal system is 
relevantly similar to domestic constitutional systems. While these reasons are, 
perhaps, inconclusive on whether and the extent to which international law can 
inform comparative constitutional law as a general matter, they at least suggest 
that one should take care before comparing the regimes (or their parts) and that 
such exercises may not qualify as comparative constitutional law in any case. 
Methodologically, these reasons likely also put the onus on those who seek to 
compare to explain why their proposed comparison is apt. Meeting that onus 
may also require addressing different considerations than meeting the onus for 
establishing the aptness of classical comparative constitutional analysis. These 
findings are individually and jointly important for our understanding of the 
contours of comparative constitutional law as a discipline and decisions about 
whether and when to invoke international law when conducting comparative 
scholarship or deciding legal cases using comparative or foreign materials. 
The first three parts of my argument are descriptive. Part I outlines relevant 
phenomena. Part II limits my focus. Part III identifies recognized necessary 
features of domestic constitutions and constitutional legal orders. The next three 
parts are substantive. Part IV outlines the strongest arguments for the Charter as 
the center of an international constitutional order. Part V demonstrates that the 
argument in Part IV is not as strong as it appears and provides an original case 
against comparison (at least as a regular practice). It demonstrates that the 
Charter lacks core features of domestic constitutions, the Charter-centered legal 
order lacks features of domestic constitutional legal orders, and future 
international constitutional orders will likely importantly differ from domestic 
constitutional orders. It then raises conceptual problems for comparison: the 
practices of international and domestic law query whether international law is 
independent of domestic practice in a way that will allow international law to 
serve as a comparator and many apparent comparative uses of international law 
are simple domestic legal applications. It then explains how arguments for a 
Charter-based constitutional system are undermined by the Charter’s lack of 
common domestic constitutional legal entitlements and by history. These 
arguments against recognition are only presented in brief due to space 
constraints and clearly do not suffice to bar comparation between international 
and domestic orders, but they jointly suggest that comparison between these 
orders does not qualify as comparative constitutional law and likely suffice to 
limit the circumstances in which international law can be used to fulfill 
comparative constitutional law’s purposes. Indeed, the instances in which 
international law is appropriate for judicial resolution of cases are rarely 
instances in which it is viewed constitutionally. This (possibly inconclusive) 
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skepticism about the domains in which international law should be used in 
constitutional matters at least problematizes claims that comparison is usually 
apt. I address objections in Part VI. 
 
 
I. RELEVANT PHENOMENA 
 
 
Three phenomena are relevant to this discussion: the constitutionalization 
of international law, interaction between international and domestic laws, and 
the search for comparative law methodological best practices. To begin, many 
scholars agree that international law is undergoing a process of 
constitutionalization, but that process is ongoing and incomplete.9 Debate on the 
nature of this constitutionalization continues. Constitutionalization as a process 
of securing certain foundational norms distinctive of all legal communities is 
distinct from constitutionalization as a process of identifying a hierarchical law 
that binds all communities.10 Domestic “constitutions” serve the latter role and 
are partially justified by their ability to secure the former.11 Yet, while some 
institutions must ensure that constitutional principles are at the top of a 
normative hierarchy for constitutionalization in any sense to be realized,12 it is 
unclear whether the kind of hierarchically superior legal regime or document 
that courts invoke when doing comparative constitutional law will best ensure 
that international law is foundationally grounded in and helps further norms 
distinctive of all legal communities.13 These difficulties are partially responsible 
for a break in the literature on the constitutionalization of international law. 
Some scholars seek to identify the document or documents that will be 
hierarchically superior to all other international law and serve the role of 
constitutions in domestic constitutional orders.14 Other scholars seek to ensure 
that certain norms are fulfilled even absent a hierarchical document, documents, 
or even (constitutional) case law, with some further questioning whether 
domestic constitutional forms are most likely to ensure that these norms are 
foundational and furthered in international law.15  
Regardless of whether international law’s “constitutionalization” is ongoing 
or complete and of the form it is taking or should take, international law plays a 
role in domestic law and vice versa. Domestic courts appeal to international law 
to solve cases. Some are legally bound to do so.16 In “monist” states, 
international law directly applies as domestic law when a treaty goes into force,17 
 
 
 
9 KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 4; Fassbender, supra note 2, at 532, 576. 
10 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 752–753. 
11 Id. at 752–753. 
12 Dupuy, supra note 2, at 3. 
13 KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 23. 
14 See generally Sloan, supra note 2; Dupuy, supra note 2; Fassbender, supra note 2; Gardbaum, 
supra note 2. 
15 E.g., KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1. 
16 E.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(1)(b). 
17 E.g., Joseph G.J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 66 (1936); NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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so courts must use international law to resolve some cases. Use of international 
law in “dualist” states where an international law has not undergone 
implementation procedures to become part of domestic law is contentious, but 
dualist state courts too sometimes appeal to international law to understand 
concepts and otherwise interpret domestic laws.18 Domestic laws, including 
comparative analyses, also help establish international law’s content.19 Absent 
frequent judicial review by international courts, domestic courts implement and 
interpret international laws.20 These actions translate international law into 
domestic proscriptions.21 They are also evidence of international law’s content 
since state practice articulates parts of that content.22  
Finally, comparative constitutional law is now a standard, if controversial, 
judicial decision-making tool and independent branch of legal academia. Actors 
in Germany, Canada, and many other liberal democracies commonly cite one 
another.23 Courts in Israel, South Africa, and elsewhere hire foreign lawyers as 
clerks to ensure some broad conformity in a transnational constitutional 
jurisprudence.24 Comparative law generally and comparative constitutional law 
particularly now have standalone status within the academy and are studied 
absent triggering events like the end of the Cold War.25 Second order questions 
of how to do legal comparison are instead central.26 Whether comparative law 
requires a single methodology, which methodology that could be, and which 
methodology qualifies as best practices (and for which ends) are vexing 
questions.27 Comparativists also debate how to select subjects of comparison.28 
Yet, it should be clear that one must compare things with fundamental 
constitutional features in order to conduct comparisons that will shed light on 
 
 
 
3–10 (Janne E. Nijman & André Nollkaemper eds., 2009); But see Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila 
Versteeg, International Law in National Legal Systems: An Empirical Investigation, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 
514, 516–517, 522–527 (2015). 
18 This is so even where international law is not formally part of the dualist state’s domestic law. See 
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999) 2 S.C.R. 817, 47 (Can.); see also 2 S. 
AFR. CONST., § 39(1)(b). 
19 Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
501 (2000); Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating 
and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 57 (2011). 
20 Id. 
21 Knop, supra note 19. 
22 Roberts, supra note 19, at 62. 
23 See, e.g., Choudhry, supra note 8, at 5–10. 
24 See, e.g., YALE LAW SCHOOL CAREER DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, OPPORTUNITIES WITH 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND FOREIGN COURTS (2016) (listing the jobs). See also, e.g., AHARON 
BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY (2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 
83 VA. L. Rev. 771 (1997); Lorraine E. Weinrib, Constitutionalism in the Age of Rights—A 
Prolegomenon, 121 S. AFR. L.J. 278, 285 (2004) (each discussing and evaluating the relevant 
transnational actions). 
25 MARK TUSHNET, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 114 (2d 
ed. 2014). 
26 Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012) (on 
constitutional law); RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2014) (also on constitutional law); THE METHOD AND CULTURE OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARK VAN HOECKE (Maurice Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds., 
2015) (discussing broader comparisons). 
27 See generally Gunter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1985); Mathias M. Siems, The End of Comparative Law, 2 J. COMP. L. 133 (2007). 
28 See HIRSCHL, supra note 26, at 244–267 (examining options). 
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constitutions and constitutional phenomena. Comparing something with such 
features with something without them will rarely provide insight into either. 
Where several features are lacking, it is questionable whether there even is a 
constitution with which one can compare core cases. If there is no constitution 
or constitutional order, there will be no subject for most different comparative 
constitutional law analyses. When we say something is the “most different” 
constitutional order, we still believe it has sufficient features of constitutional 
orders and thus is part of the same species as other constitutional orders.29 
Literatures on these phenomena are often divorced. Intersections usually 
focus on implications of their overlap for international law. Many scholars use 
comparative law to analyze international law. Most begin with set features of 
constitutions and compare them with international law. The comparative 
constitutional analysis predates the comparison with international law. No 
statements about the content of domestic constitutional laws are meant to follow. 
Even discussion of the potential of the Charter’s ability to serve as an 
international constitution often focuses on the implications of this view for 
international law only.30 A main argument for the Charter’s constitutional status 
does not include a single comparative or constitutional law insight in its list of 
consequences of recognition.31 International courts also use comparative law to 
analyze international law.32 Addressing these questions independently is 
justifiable: “[c]omparative constitutional law concerns national court decisions 
on constitutional law, which may overlap, but are not coextensive, with domestic 
judgments on international norms.”33 Yet comparative international law, the 
study of how jurisdictions implement international law,34 demonstrates that one 
can gain valuable insights into the law by addressing them in tandem. Most 
extant insight is into the nature of international law, not constitutional law.  
This work examines the extent to which addressing these phenomena can 
help us better understand constitutional law. We can learn about international 
law by comparing the international and the domestic “constitutional orders.” 
Can we learn about constitutional law from the same kind of analysis or can we 
only apply international law in domestic situations? Is such an analysis part of 
international law, domestic constitutional law, or comparative (constitutional) 
 
 
 
29 See KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1. See also David Kennedy, New Approaches to 
Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545 (1997) 
(arguing that comparatists should understand how their work contributes to and can help further a global 
governance project with international governance elements (though Kennedy is largely an exception to 
the trend here)). 
30 Fassbender, supra note 2, at 538–551. 
31 Id. See also Sloan, supra note 2 (leveraging in-depth comparison to gain insights into international 
law but making no claims about constitutional law or the use of comparison to gain insights into 
constitutions or constitutional phenomena). 
32 E.g., Neha Jain, Comparative International Law at the ICTY: The General Principles Experiment, 
109 AM. J. INT’L L. 486, 490 (2015) (suggesting they do so unsystematically). 
33 Roberts, supra note 19, at 81. 
34 E.g., ANTHEA ROBERTS et al., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018) [hereinafter 
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW]; See also Anthea Roberts et al., Comparative International Law: 
Framing the Field, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 467, 474 (2015) (a special issue on “Exploring Comparative 
International Law”). Neither treats international law as a subject of comparative constitutional analysis. 
There is a sense which the current project fits under the “analysis” branch of the most influential definition 
of comparative international law and can be understood as a normative branch of that largely descriptive 
field. But this work is not an example of the paradigmatic comparative international law projects that can 
contribute to international law. Id. at 469–471. 
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law? We know that courts use international law in their decisions. Can they use 
international law as a source for comparative constitutional analysis that will 
shed light on constitutions and constitutional phenomena? Work in comparative 
law methodology suggests that this will only be licit where there is an 
international constitutional order like a domestic one. But can we view 
international law as having a constitution or constitutional order like a domestic 
one? Can we then use its case law as a way of understanding domestic legal 
issues? Answering all these questions completely likely requires a full-length 
book, but some initial suggestive considerations, detailed below, at least 
establish the need to take caution before invoking international law in 
comparative constitutional exercises. I provide partial answers thereto in the 
service of two master questions: Does the international legal order share 
sufficient features of domestic constitutional orders to justify judicial 
comparison between the international legal order and domestic constitutional 
orders to resolve cases? If so, when? I argue that international law’s 
constitutionalization is producing something insufficiently like modern 
domestic constitutions to gain adequate insight into domestic constitutions and 
constitutional phenomena to warrant comparison in many cases. Deciding 
domestic constitutional cases based on comparisons with international law is 
accordingly dubious in most cases given the stakes of legal decisions.35 Judges 
should accordingly be cautious about using international law for comparative 
purposes. This does not mean that international law has no role to play in the 
resolution of legal cases. International law may even have a role to play in 
understanding some constitutional phenomena. But the concerns I raise about 
international law’s purported constitutionality do suggest that international 
law’s role in comparative constitutional law should be more circumscribed than 
is often assumed. Many licit uses of international law in deciding cases are 
actually non-comparative and many comparisons between international and 
domestic laws are not best described as comparisons between truly constitutional 
phenomena. 
 
 
II. SCOPE 
 
 
The case for international law as a source for comparative constitutional 
analysis generally is, again and of course, too broad a topic for one work. I thus 
limit the scope of my analysis. While constitutionalization can take several 
forms, I focus on constitutionalization as a process of identifying a hierarchical 
law that binds all communities.36 Above, I contrasted this sense of 
constitutionalization with a sense of constitutionalization as a process of 
securing foundational norms distinctive of all legal communities.37 Call these 
“legal ordering” and “norm-diffusing” senses of constitutionalization. The legal 
 
 
 
35 Where we gain insight into some constitutional phenomena from such comparison, there is reason 
to question whether the comparison is legal, rather than academic or moral, in nature and whether 
international law has special insight or authority in academic or moral works. 
36 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 752–753. 
37 Id. 
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ordering sense looks for a common structure between entities. The norm-
diffusing sense looks for a stable set of norms across jurisdictions. These senses 
may not always coexist. My interest here is in the legal ordering sense alone. 
This focus may elide important differences between other types of 
constitutionalization,38 but I address parts of some of those distinctions and 
others are orthogonal to this particular project. Two representative sets of 
distinctions make this clear. First, I integrate Pierre-Marie Dupuy’s distinction 
between two kinds of constitutions: on his “material” or “substantial” view, “a 
constitution is to be considered as a set of legal principles of paramount 
importance for every one of the subjects belonging to the social community ruled 
by it” and the principles are placed above all other components of the legal 
system in a hierarchy of norms, while on his “organic” or “institutional” view, 
a constitution “points to the designation of public organs, the separation of 
powers and the different institutions which are endowed each with its own 
competencies.”39 My criteria for legal ordering constitutionalization below 
incorporates parts of both kinds.  
Second, distinctions crucial to ongoing debates about the sources of 
constitutionalization in the norm-diffusing sense—contrasting traditional 
approaches seeking national sources of existing norms,40 pluralistic approaches 
in which norms are produced by multiple overlapping centers of public 
authority,41 and new approaches in which norms are produced by a mix of 
private and public sources42—are not directly relevant here. The sources, relative 
value of, and best means of fulfilling norms are good research topics. For 
instance, constitutional legal orders may protect the wrong norms, including 
those we would not want a norm-diffusing sense of constitutionalization to 
emphasize. Yet even determining whether this is generally true requires different 
work on the nature of legal ordering constitutions first.43 Study of the shared 
norms of international and domestic constitutional orders is then common. 
Where harmonization is a core comparative law concern and shared norms aid 
harmonization, such projects may be central to comparative law.44 I nonetheless 
focus elsewhere, partly to avoid overlap with existing research and partly 
because I am interested in comparison for legal purposes and abstractly 
comparing norms is not a legal task. One needs to compare similar things to gain 
insight in comparative analysis. Similarity in law requires that norms exist in 
similar legal structures. Constitutional documents and orders in domestic 
 
 
 
38 My approach responds to related concerns raised by Garrett Wallace Brown. See Garrett Wallace 
Brown, The Constitutionalization of What?, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 201 (2012). 
39 Dupuy, supra note 2, at 3. 
40 E.g., constitutional contributions to the “legal transplants” literature. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 15 (2d ed. 1993) (on transplants).  
41 E.g., Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317, 321 (2002); Neil 
Walker, Constitutional Pluralism Revisited, 22 EUR. L. J. 333, 354 (2016). 
42 Compare GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND GLOBALIZATION (2012), with NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER (Stephen Gill & A. 
Claire Cutler eds., 2014). 
43 See The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, supra note 41, at 323. Future legal orders could be 
tailored to meet different norm-diffusing goals. Calling such systems constitutional in the legal ordering 
sense today would be premature. While the pluralist model was designed to describe the European Union 
model of governance, we cannot assume the E.U. is like a domestic constitutional order. 
44 But see Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 699 (1991). 
See also infra the discussion of the “Shared Project Argument.” 
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spheres do not take pluralistic forms or give primary powers to private actors in 
ways that would allow international legal orders that tried to instantiate some 
values of the norm-diffusing sense of constitution to be proper comparators for 
domestic ones.45  
Whether domestic constitutions should be pluralistic is an excellent 
question, but the second limitation on my current research task provides reason 
not to address it: I choose to focus primarily on judicial comparison here. Many 
stakeholders do comparative constitutional law.46 But the stakes of comparison 
are highest in judicial settings. Judges who exercise improper comparisons risk 
making binding bad law that improperly allocates legal rights and obligations. 
Proper bases of comparison are thus most necessary in judicial decision-making. 
The judiciary’s role as user of international and comparative law also makes this 
focus an interesting case study in whether international law as comparative law 
is licit.47 Judges must apply laws and explore legal phenomenon. The general 
nature of norms is beyond their competence and authority. They instead explore 
how norms exist in legal structures. They can only look at norms in other 
structures when the structures are like those in their jurisdictions. They otherwise 
risk importing norms that would not operate in the same way in their system 
(and could go against the nature of the system he is supposed to protect). Norm-
diffusion is at most a small part of the judicial role and secondary to a 
commitment to applying one’s own law that requires comparison only with legal 
systems like one’s own. My narrower focus lets us identify the value of 
comparison in its most important genuinely legal form, helping to see if and 
when comparison with international orders can provide insight into central 
constitutional issues (or whether it should be peripheral).  
One may argue that my so-limited project is too academic to warrant 
sustained analysis: judicial use of international law as a comparator is 
uncommon. Yet this project’s academic nature puts it on a par with most 
comparative constitutional law works. Judges rarely use any constitutional 
comparison to decide cases.48 Foreign citations are infrequent even in 
paradigmatic examples of nations that cite foreign law comparison between 
countries to decide cases is rarer still.49 Moreover, there is reason to think that 
my own academic project is also important for understanding law and legal 
method. Questions of what it means to have a constitutional structure, when it is 
legitimate to study the law of another nation to resolve high stakes issues, and 
 
 
 
45 See infra Part V. 
46 See generally Hirschl, supra note 26. 
47 See COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 34. 
48 See VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2010); See 
also Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau, Conclusion: The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges: A Limited Practice, an Uncertain Future, in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS 
BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 411 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013). Comparison 
between the domestic and international is more common in international decision-making than in 
domestic decision-making. This raises the question of whether the converse would be justified. 
49 Commentary often focuses on the American case. See, e.g., Peter McCormick, American Citations 
and the McLachlin Court: An Empirical Study, 47 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 83 (2009). This is appropriate. 
Canadian courts cite American courts more than alternatives and the issue is generalized. See, e.g. 
Gianluca Gentili, Canada: Protecting Rights in a “Worldwide Rights Culture”: An Empirical Study of 
the Use of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada (1982-2010), in THE USE OF FOREIGN 
PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 39 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds. 2013, 
2013). 
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what similarities and other features are required to conduct comparative analysis 
are important for many tasks. They may be necessary to answer prior to 
answering the question of what kind of legal structure best fulfills the norm-
diffusing sense of constitutionalization. We need to know what basic 
constitutional structures are available to spread the norms before we can 
determine which spreads them best. This analysis can contribute to legal study 
regardless of how often this kind of comparison currently takes place. Infrequent 
use of this form of comparison may even make it easier to address questions 
about the value of forms of comparison without wading into the political debates 
surrounding other forms of comparison. The analysis can guide future decision-
makers faced with situations where strict comparison may be relevant and 
provide insight into whether and why current forms of comparison are apt.50 
Finally, while I am interested in whether the international legal order is 
constitutional in nature, I also study whether a constitutional document, the 
Charter, has sufficient constitutional features because it is a candidate central 
constitutional document for the most likely international constitutional order and 
several scholars argue that it is the international constitution now. Scholars argue 
that several documents do, can, or should play the role of international 
constitution. Arguments that each fulfills criteria for constitutional documents 
are available.51 Yet, several reasons justify focusing on the Charter. 
Academically, it is a common candidate in the literature for the world 
constitution.52 Testing the Charter’s candidacy thus responds to the literature. 
Functionally, the United Nations [U.N.] is the best candidate for an international 
community that could be made into a constitutional order. The Charter is its 
foundational document and could play a central role in the constitutionalization 
of the U.N. system. Legally, Article 103 of the Charter prioritizes Charter 
obligations, apparently providing some hierarchical status.53 There is some 
indication that the Charter (partly) fulfills some other criteria of constitutions.54 
Finally, structurally, the Charter shares enough features with other candidate 
constitutions to be instructive for identifying problems other candidates may 
face. If the Charter is the best candidate for the constitution of the international 
legal order and there are reasons to be skeptical about using it as the lynchpin of 
international law as comparative constitutional law, this provides reason to 
generally question the use of international law as a comparative constitutional 
law source. I thus focus on the Charter, but also explore whether it could 
combine with the International Bill of Rights to fulfill the role of a constitutional 
document.55 
 
 
 
50 My findings bear on academic use of international law in CCL, but I make no claims about 
academic comparison beyond implying some limitations thereon. 
51 For a less obvious example, many documents claim authority over specific areas of international 
law. See, e.g., Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S 185; Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
These and similar documents could combine into a multi-part functional international constitution like 
many multi-part domestic constitutions. 
52 Sloan, supra note 2; Dupuy, supra note 2; Fassbender, supra note 2; Gardbaum, supra note 2. 
53 U.N. Charter art. 103. 
54 See infra Part IV (and criticisms in Part V). 
55 My focus on these documents is also emblematic of another way in which my analysis is limited: 
I focus primarily on global legal regimes here with the United Nations-based system serving as my 
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III. FEATURES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS 
 
 
 Comparative constitutional law projects like this require that 
comparators share a sufficient number of features to qualify as constitutions and, 
thus, subjects of comparison. What are the necessary and sufficient features of a 
constitution capable of serving as the subject of comparison? For fairness’s sake, 
I defer to those who argue that an international constitution or constitutional 
order is sufficiently similar to domestic ones to warrant comparison in many 
circumstances. A combination and alteration of Stephen Gardbaum and Bardo 
Fassbender’s accounts of the features of candidate constitutions reveal five 
features that global constitutions should fulfill if they are going to be like 
domestic ones and serve as proper bases of comparison: (a) constituent authority, 
(b) hierarchy, (c) entrenchment, (d) enforcement, and (e) bindingness. While one 
can question whether any one of these criteria is necessary to have a domestic 
constitutional order (and my own views on what is necessary differ from these 
proposals), the criteria in Gardbaum and Fassbender are plausible candidates for 
at least paradigmatic features of domestic constitutions. Where they are offered 
as key features of domestic constitutions by those who make the case for 
international law as a source of comparative constitutional law, accepting them 
as given for present purposes is fair to the authors who oppose me and the scope 
of their arguments. Candidate international constitutions should fulfill at least 
most of the five criteria if they are going to be comparators with domestic 
constitutions, even by the lights of those who seek to identify international 
constitutions.56  
Gardbaum and Fassbender make generally plausible cases for these criteria. 
Gardbaum states that constitutional documents are generally “made by a special, 
episodic, and self-consciously constituent power,” highest in the hierarchy of 
laws in an area, and “entrenched against ordinary methods of amendment or 
repeal which apply to statutes and other forms of law.”57 He ultimately denies 
that “special methods of enforcement” are required,58 but some form of 
enforcement is generally required and implicit in Gardbaum’s account. Judicial 
review is commonly used to fulfill this requirement in domestic constitutional 
orders but is not the universal method of doing so. Fassbender then establishes 
that entrenchment is characteristic of constitutions:59 they “almost always 
present a complex of fundamental norms governing the organization and 
performance of governmental functions in a given state … and the relationship 
between state authorities and citizens.”60 Constitutions should then be difficult 
 
 
 
primary candidate for a constitutional order. There is, of course, a sense in which regional legal systems 
are more “constitutional” than the more global example on which I choose to focus here. But whether 
those systems are genuinely “international” is itself a contested issue, so regional systems are not strong 
foci for the present inquiry. As I further note below, regional systems are not themselves unified into a 
global collection of laws governed by a common “constitution.” 
56 But see Richard Albert, The Cult of Constitutionalism, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373 (2012); 
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 754. 
57 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 754. 
58 Id. 
59 Fassbender, supra note 2, at 537. 
60 Id. at 536. 
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to terminate or alter. Constitutions thus tend to bind government institutions and 
community members alike.61 Even where community members’ actions are not 
directly subject to constitutional review, their rights against government are 
established through a constitution. These rights are against both the state’s main 
organ and any organs created under its primary constitutional authority. 
These criteria can, of course, be criticized, but they suffice for present 
purposes. For instance, constitutional documents likely do not reflect the “will 
of the power” in a way that would reflect a substantive conception of constituent 
authority.62 Where some nations recognize that jus cogens norms can supersede 
domestic constitutions even from the perspective of domestic constitutional law, 
domestic constitutions likely only need to be very high in a hierarchy, rather than 
occupying the highest position. Gardbaum’s criteria are otherwise descriptively 
and normatively helpful. After all, even imposed constitutions that do not reflect 
the will of the people, like that of Japan, are the result of a process that aims to 
create the boundaries of constitutional authority for the people on whom it is 
imposed. Even persons who impose a constitution through defined procedures 
may qualify as a constituent power on a less substantive account. The idea that 
all constitutional documents are made at a set time with a certain special purpose 
of creating special documents is hardly implausible. Likewise, at least 
paradigmatic examples of, if not all, domestic constitutions do seem to at least 
purport to have a high place in the state’s hierarchy of laws and to resist change 
through regular legislative procedures. Where scholars invoke these plausible 
criteria to make cases for an international constitution, invoking them here is 
dialectically useful notwithstanding any caveats I would add. 
We can then identify features of domestic constitutional orders that an 
international equivalent should possess. A constitutional order has these features 
regardless of whether they have a specific document with the features in the 
preceding paragraph. The pro-international constitutionalization scholars Jan 
Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein suggest that a global constitution will 
have features that are shared by many constitutions, including political 
accountability and a commitment to the rule of law that itself requires separation 
of powers, procedural rules, and judicial review.63 These can be understood as 
features of constitutional orders, rather than constitutional documents. We can 
specify their requirements as (a2) authoritativeness, (b2) a unity of laws, and 
(c2) separation of powers. First, constitutional orders are authoritative. The 
whole order must fulfill the criteria of hierarchy and bindingness even absent a 
specific constitutional document. Otherwise, there is not a proper subject of the 
order. Fassbender further specifies that many entities, state and citizen alike, 
must be bound for a constitutional order to be complete.64 Second, constitutional 
orders unify a body of laws. This follows from what it means to have a 
constitutionalized legal system in any sense. Laws need to be unified by a set of 
 
 
 
61 Id. at 569–670 (Fassbender further states that they seek to be of indefinite length but notes that this 
is not a necessary feature of constitutions and provides a major counterexample. Id. at 578). 
62 The literature here is voluminous but see Mark Tushnet, Peasants with Pitchforks, and Toilers with 
Twitter: Constitutional Revolutions and the Constituent Authority, 13 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 639 (2015) 
for a representative critical view of constituent authority that views it largely as a legal construct. 
63 See Geir Ulfstein, Institutions and Competences in KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, 
at 55–67 [hereinafter Institutions]. 
64 Fassbender, supra note 2, at 536. 
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norms for one sense of constitutionalization to occur. An institution must have 
authority over a wide set of legal domains for the other to occur. This unity 
requirement also arguably follows from constitutions’ necessary constituent 
power and hierarchy. Domestic constitutions always seek to create a community 
under the same law and create some higher law unifying others into a discrete 
body under one major law to do so. Third, constitutional orders separate 
governmental powers. Absent some separation of powers, an entity can usurp 
the constitution as the ultimate authority in a domain. Empirically, moreover, 
almost all domestic constitutions create distinct roles for different government 
bodies.65 This may not require full checks on the authority of each entity, like 
those found in liberal-democratic constitutions. But it does require clearly 
defined roles and some way to ensure those roles are respected in practice. 
Deferring to pro-constitutionalization scholars on these criteria likewise seems 
dialectically fair. 
 
 
IV. THE CASE FOR THE CHARTER AS INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTION 
 
 
There are good faith arguments that there can be an international 
constitutional order and that the Charter (on its own or in conjunction with the 
International Bill of Rights) is the constitution at its center. I will address three: 
the Formal Superiority Argument, the Shared Project Argument, and the 
Similarity Argument. Successful versions of these arguments could produce an 
order that can be the subject of licit comparison with domestic constitutional 
regimes in most cases. If the international order were a genuine constitutional 
order, a default position that it should be the subject of comparative 
constitutional analysis would be apt. I briefly outline each argument here and 
return to them with a more critical stance below. 
 
A. THE FORMAL SUPERIORITY ARGUMENT 
 
The clearest legal argument for the Charter as the constitution of the 
international legal system is that it is formally superior to other international 
legal documents in public international law. Article 103 states that where “the 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and 
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under 
the present Charter shall prevail.”66 The Charter is supreme among 
“international agreements,” providing it with superiority over other treaties. This 
may apply to all U.N. law, including United Nations Security Council [UNSC] 
 
 
 
65 Even if “separation of powers” refers to several kinds of things (e.g., GEOFFREY MARSHALL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Clarendon Law Series 1971)), constitutional orders must include one to 
qualify as a constitutional order like those in domestic regimes. Champions of the constitutionalization 
of international law believe this is necessary. My description infra of the powers of entities in the 
international community challenges any plausible separation criterion. 
66 U.N. Charter art. 103. 
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decisions.67 Such a reading supports the view that the provision is at least chief 
among many international laws. “International agreement” is not bounded by 
the qualifier “U.N.” suggesting the Charter could have some formal superiority 
over non-U.N. agreements from the perspective of international law.68 The 
Charter thus plays a hierarchical role in international law such that international 
law includes something playing a constitutional role. Comparison with the 
system it instantiates would be licit if the system were also sufficiently similar 
to domestic constitutional orders. Other questions about the aptness of particular 
constitutional comparisons would remain, but these questions arise for any 
comparative constitutional analysis: the Charter-based international legal 
system’s status as a generally acceptable subject for constitutional comparison 
would be clear. 
 
B. THE SHARED PROJECT ARGUMENT 
 
Even if the Charter is not formally superior to all international laws, its role 
as a foundational document in a project with international and domestic 
components could, in turn, still warrant comparison in its domestic parts. The 
Shared Project Argument suggests that international law and domestic 
constitutional law are part of the same project, which is itself part of a global 
constitutional order. This argument, which is most frequently supported in the 
narrower domain of international human rights law, is grounded in the temporal 
link between and similar content of modern international law and some modern 
constitutions. Many modern international law and world constitutions were 
created in 1945 or later.69 Many modern constitutions share similar features with 
each other and with international human rights law particularly; many such 
constitutions were explicitly created with reference to one another or 
international human rights law.70 This is sometimes used to explain why 
particular international legal documents are part of the same project.71 
Comparing parts of the same project is then licit: they are linked in their shared 
role in a greater scheme and their definitions of terms reinforce each other. If the 
Shared Project Argument succeeds, then at least international human rights laws 
are proper bases for comparison with at least constitutional human rights 
provisions by default—and the same can be said for the wider legal systems 
meant to protect those rights. 
 
C. THE SIMILARITY ARGUMENT 
 
Content-related aspects of the Shared Project Argument also support a 
Similarity Argument for comparison. Gardbaum argues that the International 
Bill of Rights has international constitutional status.72 Per Gardbaum, 
 
 
 
67 See Peter Hilpold, EU Law and UN Law in Conflict: The Kadi Case, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF 
U.N. L.141, 161 (2009). See also Fassbender, supra note 2 at 577–578, 586. 
68 U.N. Charter art. 103. Positive law suggests otherwise from regional authorities’ perspective. 
Hilpold, supra note 67, discusses a classic case. 
69 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 750–751. 
70 See note 24.  
71 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 750–751. 
72 Id. at 756. 
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international human rights law shares a similar structure and content with 
domestic constitutional laws and so the International Bill of Rights that 
fundamentally grounds it can be the subject of a Shared Project Argument.73 If 
so, comparison between at least parts of international law and constitutional law 
may be licit. Even if one contested Gardbaum’s empirical bases here, the 
international rights register clearly partially overlaps with many post-World War 
II [WWII] constitutional rights registries and limitation clauses are clearly 
common to both. This suggests that the rights are similar things that can be 
compared. The International Bill of Rights could then serve as a constitution if 
it had something to support its hierarchical status. Alternatively, the Charter, 
while not granting any human rights obligations on its own, could be the 
constitution that guarantees these rights through its formal superiority and 
prioritization of human rights norms in its interpretation. Comparison with a 
system that contains and protects the same kinds of things would be licit by 
default. International law could, again, play a central role in comparative 
constitutional law. 
 
 
V. THE CASE AGAINST USING THE CHARTER IN DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMPARISONS 
 
 
Unfortunately, there are also many reasons not to use international law as a 
source of comparative constitutional law. Some are familiar concerns with 
domestic use of international law serving new questions. Others are original. 
When one applies the criteria for constitutional status to the Charter and the case 
for an order like domestic constitutional orders to the Charter-based system, one 
sees that (A) the Charter lacks sufficient features to be analogized to a 
constitution and (B) the attached international legal order lacks rudimentary 
features necessary for being a proper subject of comparison with domestic 
constitutional orders. International documents that could purport to be 
constitutions, including the Charter, have different statuses and roles in the 
international legal system and claimed constitutionalization thereof. The 
constitutionalization of law literature suggests that (C) completion of the 
constitutionalization process will not remedy (B). There are further conceptual 
problems with comparing any international legal order to domestic ones: 
international law (D) could be understood as lacking sufficient independence 
from domestic law to allow proper comparison and (E) is often just applied in 
domestic contexts rather than serving as a basis for comparison. Moreover, 
returning to arguments in the preceding section, (F) the case for the Shared 
Content Argument is overstated and (G) the history behind the Shared Project 
Argument limits its application. These arguments at least suggest that the bar for 
establishing that comparison between international and domestic constitutional 
legal phenomena is higher than many suppose. They also provide some (clearly 
inconclusive) reasons to be skeptical about the aptness of many comparisons 
and, further, suggest that many apt comparisons are not exercises in comparative 
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constitutional law but are instead other kinds of legal analyses and may 
accordingly operate according to different norms than comparative 
constitutional law alone. 
 
A. THE CHARTER LACKS KEY CONSTITUTIONAL FEATURES 
 
It is not clear that the Charter has the constitutional features proponents of 
the constitutionalization of international law claim are distinctive of domestic 
constitutions and plausibly necessary for proper comparison: (a) constituent 
authority, (b) hierarchy, (c) entrenchment, (d) enforcement, and (e) bindingness. 
At minimum, the Charter’s attendant legal order only fulfills a few of these 
components—and, even then, often does so to a lesser degree than at least 
paradigmatic domestic constitutions. Comparing constitutional documents with 
the Charter is thus non-ideal and it would be surprising if the quasi-constitutional 
Charter-centered order would be a proper comparator for domestic constitution-
centered orders. This alone suggests that one should take caution before 
comparing the documents or orders at issue. While the case for each feature of 
a domestic constitution—and, indeed, each feature of a constitutional order in 
subsection (B)—could also be the topic of its own work, brief suggestive 
remarks on each provides ample reason to question the case for the Charter’s 
constitutionality and, by extension, the case for regular use of the document in 
comparative constitutional law. 
 
1. Constituent Authority 
 
It is at best controversial to suggest that the Charter has constituent authority 
for the international legal community. Gardbaum grants that there is “no general 
conception of a constituent power at the international legal level.”74 The Charter 
arguably was not intended to be a world constitution in 1945.75 There is some 
evidence that some observers viewed the drafting process as a “constitutional 
moment.”76 Fassbender points to the use of the term “Charter” rather than 
“Covenant” and the use of the opening phrase “We the Peoples of the United 
Nations,” rather than “The High Contracting Parties,” as further evidence of its 
intended constitutionality.77 Yet, even if the Charter was a “special, episodic, 
and self-consciously constituent power” in the creation of the U.N., it is unlikely 
that it was intended to be the constituent authority for the international 
community at large. Several international legal documents are “Charters” or 
even “Constitutions” so the naming convention does not make it unique.78 Even 
proponents of the Charter’s constitutionality grant that the preambulatory 
 
 
 
74 Id. 
75 Tomuschat, supra note 3, at ix. 
76 Fassbender, supra note 2, at 573. 
77 Id. at 580. 
78 The fact that it is not the only “Charter” is further evidence of international law’s fragmentation 
into subject matter-based subsystems. See Int’l Law Comm’n Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, U.N. Doc A. /CN.4/L.682 and Add.1 and Corr. 1 (Apr. 13, 2006). Fragmentation will also 
be problematic below. 
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language plays no role in the development.79 Interpretation of other constitutions 
and the language Fassbender highlights may intend to identify the Charter’s 
importance rather than its constitutional or hierarchical status. These three brief 
points are representative of the issues facing a case for constituent authority.80 
Even if the creation of the Charter—or some other international document—
does not qualify as the passage of a special law for a special purpose, whether 
that purpose was the creation of a constitutional order remains at best debatable. 
There is at least a difference in degree, if not kind, in the extent to which the 
international legal system meets this criterion for constitutionality. The degree 
to which it is fulfilled then likely only pertains to the U.N. system and whether 
the members of the U.N. constitute the relevant community for comparative 
purposes is debatable. 
 
2. Hierarchy 
 
The hierarchical status of the Charter is then not as straightforward as the 
Formal Superiority Argument suggests. There is a much stronger argument that 
this feature is lacking. Article 103 presents some problems on its own. The 
hierarchical status for “legal obligations” language in the text is narrower than 
the language in many constitutions that are supposed to form the basis of the 
Shared Project Argument. Compare article 103 of the Charter with subsection 
52(1) of Canada’s most recent constitutional document: 
 
52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of 
Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force 
or effect.81 
 
Then compare with section 2 of South Africa’s constitution: 
 
2. This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or 
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations 
imposed by it must be fulfilled.82 
 
“Any law” is broader than “legal obligations.” “Law or conduct” is broader still. 
The invalidity language in the domestic constitutional provisions is stronger than 
the language suggesting that the Charter “shall prevail” in cases of conflict. Any 
apparent Charter hierarchy thus applies to a narrower set of legal phenomena 
and has less actual impact than the hierarchy of domestic constitutions. This 
provides reason to question whether the documents are proper comparators.  
Further problems arise when considering the relationship between the 
Charter and non-treaty international law. Even if we grant that “any other 
 
 
 
79 Sloan, supra note 2, at 80. 
80 Despite complexities in, e.g., ZORAN OKLOPCIC, BEYOND THE PEOPLE: SOCIAL IMAGINARY AND 
CONSTITUENT IMAGINATION (2018), the problems here exist on most views of the authority’s 
requirements. 
81 Constitution Act 1982, § 52 (UK); Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 (UK). 
82 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 2. 
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international agreement” includes UNSC decisions,83 the provision is silent on 
customary international law.84 The fraught relationship between Charter norms 
and jus cogens norms and questions about which is superior also raises 
problems.85 The Charter may not include all jus cogens norms.86 Such norms 
could be superior despite this lack. A question about whether the Charter is 
hierarchically superior to jus cogens norms thus remains even if we can resolve 
concerns about its superiority over non-treaty laws like custom. The fact that 
regional courts that are plausibly international do not apply Charter-based law 
that conflicts with what they take to be superior, arguably jus cogens, human 
rights norms further suggests that recognition of the Charter as supreme is not 
as common as one may think.87  
Questions about the formal superiority of the Charter over other norms are 
particularly complicated when human rights are involved. The lack of a 
normative hierarchy in international human rights law is widely noted.88 Yet the 
supremacy of human rights norms is distinctive of the model grounding the 
Shared Project Argument.89 The relative status of Charter, human rights, and jus 
cogens norms in international law is thus famously vexing. The Charter alone 
cannot protect human rights and article 103 famously does not contain human 
rights norms.90 It is arguably unclear whether the Charter can adequately protect 
them in tandem with other laws. The ICCPR and ICESCR are quasi-
constitutional since interpretative rules suggest we should read other laws in 
light of them, but they are not formally supreme in conflict cases.91 Some, but 
not all, international human rights are jus cogens norms. The Charter’s 
superiority over human rights norms, jus cogens or otherwise, or jus cogens 
norms generally remains contestable. So too does its constitutionality. The U.N.-
based human rights law system likely has sufficient rules and authorities to 
address some of these concerns, but controversy on what qualifies as hierarchy 
is understandable. The issue does seem to differ from that of domestic 
constitutional equivalents. 
 
3. Entrenchment 
 
Entrenchment of the Charter is, in turn, also at best weaker than that of many 
domestic constitutions. No termination provisions allowing for the end of the 
U.N. system or of Charter application are included in the Charter.92 Yet special 
amendment procedures are also lacking.93 Practically, the Charter is sufficiently 
foundational to the U.N. that amendment would likely need to take place 
alongside amendment of other international legal documents. But this is true of 
 
 
 
83 Hilpold, supra note 67, at 161. 
84 Dupuy, supra note 2, at 13. 
85 Id. at 6–11. 
86 Id. at 8. 
87 KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1–3. 
88 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 754. 
89 See note 24. 
90 U.N. Charter art. 103. 
91 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 756–757. 
92 Fassbender, supra note 2, at 569–570. 
93 U.N. Charter art. 103. 
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many international legal documents and does not make the Charter specially 
entrenched. This feature ultimately appears missing for nearly any candidate 
international constitution. Among candidate constitutions, only the ICCPR 
appears to have special amendment requirements.94  
 
4. Enforcement 
 
The lack of enforcement of international laws generally is, of course, 
famous. No one enforces most international legal judicial decisions.95 
International courts cannot even make decisions that would “enforce” many 
international laws through judicial pronouncement. Most notably, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) cannot invalidate laws, in contrast to, e.g., 
aforementioned German, Canadian, and South African courts.96 The ICJ’s 
limited jurisdiction creates even greater limits on its enforcement capabilities. 
Blaine Sloan identifies the lack of compulsory jurisdiction for the ICJ and 
interpretive principles as severe limits on judicial review of the Charter; he then 
notes that only states can appear before the court.97 While not all domestic courts 
have unlimited jurisdiction,98 the ICJ’s jurisdiction is more limited than most 
domestic apex courts. Other international courts have even more limited 
jurisdiction, often focusing only on certain subject matters, and only having 
jurisdiction over parties who explicitly agreed to be bound by their decisions. 
Any international law “enforcement” authorities have minimal powers.  
The concern about a lack enforcement is not reducible to concerns about the 
lack of judicial review under the Charter, VCLT, and ICCPR alone.99 Those 
concerns does not suffice to differentiate the international legal order and 
domestic constitutional orders on its own where some domestic constitutional 
orders do not include judicial review either. Rather, the lack of enforcement 
jurisdiction in each of these cases highlights a broader issue with the 
international legal order: no one has an uncontroversial enforcement power in 
the international legal order. Extra-judicial attempts accordingly engender 
significant controversy. Where, in turn, acts by some international bodies and 
individual members likely qualify as enforcement measures, the enforcement 
measures still differ from domestic ones in significant ways. These differences 
alone also do not suffice to suggest that comparison between orders is inapt. But 
they do at least serve as potential differences that can and likely do combine with 
more significant ones to present a case against presuming that comparison 
between the different sphere is necessarily apt. 
 
 
 
94 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 758. 
95 Enforcement powers are missing in the Charter. See Charter, supra note 3. On enforcement, see 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
96 Fassbender suggests only a small number of domestic constitutions allow judicial review and have 
authority over all government entities below it; Fassbender, supra note 2, at 575. This is not empirically 
validated. His claim that judicial review is a relatively new phenomenon in domestic courts is undermined 
by, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Moreover, where the Shared Project Argument focuses 
on modern constitutions that allow judicial review, denying enforcement requires abandoning that 
Argument. 
97 Sloan, supra note 2, at 72–73. 
98 Ron Park, Is the Political Question Doctrine Jurisdictional or Prudential?, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
255, 259–263 (2016). 
99 KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 25. 
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5. Bindingness 
 
Finally, the Charter is also less widely binding than domestic constitutions. 
It only binds states and really only U.N. member states. Being bound is voluntary 
in a way that being bound by domestic constitutions usually is not. 
Constitutional laws also tend to bind all public entities that are created under 
their auspices. This is not true of international quasi-constitutions. For an 
example of a more broadly binding constitution, return to South Africa. Its 
constitutional Bill of Rights “applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.”100 All state entities are bound. 
International law, by contrast, generally does not bind many international 
organizations created under its authority.101 Gardbaum admits that compared 
with “domestic and supranational [e.g., European Union (E.U.)] constitutional 
law, this is a significant limitation on constitutional status. It is hard to conceive 
of [domestic or supranational] bills of rights not binding the political institutions 
created by a constitution.”102 This critique applies to the Charter, which only 
binds member states, not other institutions within it.103  
The U.N. also may not bind regional state-like entities with large roles in 
international law,104 creating further disanalogies between international and 
domestic “constitutions.” This is especially clear in cases where this is a conflict 
between (ostensibly international) regional law and paradigmatically 
international law. The classic European Court of Human Rights judgment in 
Kadi, which held that the E.U. is not bound by international law in cases of 
conflict between it and E.U. law (at least when E.U. law instantiates human 
rights or jus cogens norms) is arguably an example.105 Alternatively, if E.U. law 
is a form of international law, Kadi is an example of a case where the Charter 
law is subservient to other international laws. Klabbers reads the case as 
addressing “whether the United Nations (UN) Charter is hierarchically superior 
to other international institutions, including the EU itself,” with the European 
Court of Human Rights coming to a negative answer.106 The Charter-based 
system remains non-constitutional.  
Methods of resolving this issue may not rely on something with structural 
features resembling those of modern constitutions and so may not produce a 
proper comparator for many circumstances even in the future.107 A global 
federalist constitution is conceptually possible and could be compared easily 
with local constitutions in federalist states. But the possibility of such an entity 
may be as remote as that of any world constitutional order.108 Even then, 
 
 
 
100 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 8(1). 
101 Institutions, supra note 63, at 77–78. 
102 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 757. 
103 International law more broadly does not cover the variety of non-state actors, including non-
governmental organizations and individuals, who plausibly should be bound by it. E.g., KLABBERS, 
PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 11–12. 
104 Joined Cases C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P Kadi and & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and 
Commission, 2008 E.C.R. I–6351[hereinafter Kadi]. A discussion thereof is in Hilpold, supra note 67, at 
159–160. 
105 Id. 
106 KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1–3. 
107 E.g., Institutions, supra note 63, at 80. 
108 Klabbers, supra note 1, at 32. 
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construction of such a body presages comparison. The output would be 
something that would be informed by domestic laws, not something that could 
easily inform how they ought to be interpreted.109 
 
B. THE LARGER INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS STRUCTURALLY DISSIMILAR FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS 
 
Domestic opposition to the use of international materials in domestic 
adjudication partially stems from the identification of what could be deemed a 
constitutional lack in international law. Beyond domestic concerns about a 
supranational court adjudicating above each nation’s highest courts, there is a 
concern that international law is an incomplete system. Kadi is also an example 
here.110 For critics, this lack offers an example of why international materials 
should not be examined by domestic courts. This concern can be applied to the 
international legal system regardless of what we identify as the “constitution” of 
that system. The international legal order struggles with all three criteria for 
domestic systems outlined above. When combined with concerns in the 
preceding subsection, this should at least highlight the need for caution in using 
international law as a source for comparative constitutional analysis. 
 
1. Authoritativeness 
 
An authoritative international legal order is lacking. Even those who 
recognize the constitutionalization of international law recognize that treaties are 
not constitutions and most candidates are mere treaties.111 They further suggest 
that candidates like the Charter and the VCLT cannot fulfill that role since they 
only apply to states and do not even bind all of those.112 No treaty serves the 
functions of clear hierarchy and wide bindingness distinctive of constitutions. It 
is formally possible for the order to be authoritative absent a single authoritative 
document. But the international legal order generally seems to lack the broad 
hierarchy and bindingness distinctive of domestic constitutional orders. 
International law is not directly authoritative even within states, its purported 
subjects. This is especially true in dualist states where the law does not actually 
bind domestic actors until implemented into domestic law. Yet Kadi and Kadi-
like cases show that regional and domestic actors do not always view the 
international law as authoritative.113 Moreover, the system generally does not 
bind all actors that constitutional courts may bind. Recall that South Africa’s 
constitution “binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of 
state.”114 International law does not similarly bind all agents. The features of 
hierarchy and wide bindingness appear missing in the general system. While 
international law has rules for what qualifies as being a good actor within the 
system and these provide normative guidance to the actors within it, those rules 
 
 
 
109 Infra Part V(C). 
110 See Kadi, supra note 104. 
111 Geir Ulfstein, Empowerment and Constitutional Control, EJIL: TALK! (July 14, 2010). 
112 KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 25. 
113 See also Kadi, supra note 104. 
114 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 8(1). 
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do not operate like their domestic constitutional “equivalents” in practice. This 
too should provide reason to question the broader system’s “constitutional” 
status. 
 
2. A Unity of Laws 
 
The oft-noted fragmentation of international law makes it structurally 
dissimilar to constitutional law, undermining the case for comparison by 
domestic courts. Gardbaum admits that the lack of a single international human 
rights law system or source of international human rights law complicates his 
argument that the International Bill of Rights should be the global constitution. 
Gardbaum’s worry suggests another feature of constitutional orders implicit in 
the hierarchy conditions for constitutions: a unified system of laws for it to 
regulate. Fragmentation makes this difficult to identify in the international legal 
system. On one definition, fragmentation is the phenomenon whereby 
international law is not a singular entity but several legal entities lacking a clear 
overarching structure or even a clear conflicts of law solution.115 It is clear that 
“various aspects of the international legal regime are branching out and gaining 
some form of quasi-independence.”116 Given the fragmentation of international 
law and the lack of any legal entity therein to overcome it, international law as 
a whole lacks a single constitution. This lack is particularly clear from an 
international organizations perspective. There is a constitution for human rights 
bodies, a constitution for trade bodies, etc. These constitutions are not clearly 
linked by some broader constitution. It is unlikely that all are constituent in a 
way that would let them jointly serve as a global constitution. As noted above, 
many bodies created by these documents are not bound by candidate 
constitutions like the Charter. Domestic constitutions, by contrast, generally 
apply to all areas of law and all public bodies. Likewise, international law is 
often adjudicated and implemented by diverse treaty bodies.117 International 
tribunals are not organized in a hierarchical order.118 This is another formal 
difference. There is usually a clear person with authority for adjudicating 
constitutional claims in domestic jurisdictions.119 Of course, not all domestic 
constitutions are included in a singular source—oft-studies constitutions like 
those in Canada and Israel feature multiple components120—but domestic 
constitutions do at least seek to unify all laws under a singular constitutional 
order. Thus, Canada and Israel read their respective constitutions holistically and 
view all of their constitutional documents as applying to and unifying all laws 
in their states under a common framework.121 Human rights documents are 
 
 
 
115 KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 2; Christopher McCrudden, Why Do National 
Court Judges Refer to Human Rights Treaties? A Comparative International Law Analysis of CEDAW, 
109 AM. J. INT’L. L. 534, 537–538 (2015). 
116 KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 11.  
117 Institutions, supra note 63, at 48. 
118 Geir Ulfstein, The International Judiciary, in KLABBERS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL 126 (2009) [hereinafter The International Judiciary]. 
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useful in their domain but do not clearly fulfill the same role in the fragmented 
international legal arena. 
While international bodies have some constitutional elements, this at most 
suggests that international law ought to have the form of a domestic constitution 
and does not establish that constitutional law should look like international 
law.122 Arguments that sub-components of international law are themselves 
becoming “constitutionalized” further challenge the sense in which the 
international legal system is a constitutional order.123 International law purports 
to be a full system that unifies all subsystems. If the subsystems are complete 
constitutional orders—and there is at least an argument that international trade 
law is on a par with international law in its ability to establish this claim124—
unity of laws is lacking. Each system may be capable of serving as a closed 
normative order but comparing “international law” with constitutional orders 
will be inapt. If the subsystems are only constitutionalizing in the norm-diffusing 
sense, in turn, one worries that they are creating a larger subsystem linked only 
by the norms. The larger problem is that the constitutionalization—in any 
form—of what we take to be subsystems of international law seems to highlight 
the independence of these areas of law. This raises questions about the existence 
of international law as a unified whole or at least one unified like domestic 
spheres. It would be odd to compare domestic constitutional law and domestic 
or foreign intellectual property law to solve a domestic constitutional case. Yet, 
if international intellectual property law is constitutional in nature too, we would 
be warranted in comparing our domestic constitutional law with the international 
intellectual property law system if we were warranted in comparing it with 
international law simpliciter and both were constitutional in the same way. We 
would then also be warranted in comparing Charter-based law and World Trade 
Organization law to decide international constitutional cases. This would take 
us far from modern legal practice. 
Attempts to resolve these fragmentation-based problems are compelling but 
face limits. Gardbaum suggests that there will be few conflicts in practice and 
the lack of international courts to resolve them is an easy practical conflict to 
resolve.125 Yet this theoretical issue raises questions about the practical utility of 
international law as a comparator. Fassbender argues that the Charter should be 
the primary constitution and other documents, like the International Bill of 
Rights, should be accorded constitutional status only insofar as they pursue the 
foundational Charter’s aims.126 However, other scholars note that recognition of 
a world constitution of universal enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to gain 
political support. Klabbers, Ulfstein, and Peters suggest that fragmentation may 
not be per se problematic from a constitutional perspective as pluralist 
constitutionalism in which there are multiple sites of constitutional authority and 
 
 
 
122 None of this means there must be one unifying document. Canada’s Constitution, for example, 
consists of many documents, and the British constitution is unwritten; PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF CANADA (5th ed. 2007). The diffuse nature of the international laws nonetheless remains notable. 
123 See DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM (2005) 
(providing one critical summary of this argument). 
124 Id. 
125 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 754–755. 
126 Fassbender, supra note 2, at 588. 
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forms of constitutional entities could exist in the international sphere.127 
Fassbender sometimes makes similar proscriptions, despite his general view that 
the Charter could be the constitution for all international law.128 Implicit in these 
claims is a view that domestic constitutions are likewise pluralistic in nature. Yet 
I am unclear on where such pluralistic constitutions exist. The classic example, 
the E.U.,129 is just as easily described as a site of international law as of domestic 
constitutional law. While acknowledging those regional entities as international 
bodies then presents arguable sites of unified laws, even the unified regional 
legal regimes are not themselves unified into a broader international corpus. 
Other examples are arguably burgeoning,130 but the arguments in this area 
remain fierce. Aptness still cannot yet be assumed. 
 
3. Separation of Powers 
 
Finally, there is a weak sense in which the U.N. fulfills the separation of 
powers criterion insofar as all U.N. bodies have defined powers, but the roles of 
U.N. bodies and their attendant powers do not clearly map those found in 
domestic constitutional orders and actually seem to overlap in ways that make 
the international and domestic cases disanalogous and raise questions about 
whether the powers at the U.N. are separated like paradigmatic constitutional 
powers.  
The UNSC is the best candidate for global executive,131 but it only briefly, 
if ever, played the role of global executive free from challenge.132 Its other 
functions make it legislative and even quasi-judicial in a manner that undermines 
any claimed separation of powers.133 The UNSC appears to be the only 
uncontroversial lawmaker in the U.N. and then only in the domain of laws 
necessary for “international peace and security.”134 If one (plausibly) 
acknowledges the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as a law-making 
legislature, further problems arise. The UNGA and the UNSC then both hold 
law-making powers, but only in limited areas, and are frequently free from 
judicial review. These examples are representative of the general phenomenon 
whereby “the principle of separation of powers does not apply to the organs of 
international organizations.”135 The lack of judicial checks on the UNSC raises 
concerns even if we have an executive.136 Under the Charter, neither the UNSC 
nor the ICJ holds any real check on the others’ power.137 The separation of 
powers at the international quasi-constitutional level and within the international 
organizations that would hold the powers in such an order does not map onto 
established domestic norms, creating disanalogies. Even Fassbender admits that 
 
 
 
127 KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 11. 
128 See Fassbender, supra note 2, at 532, 555–61. 
129 See Constitutional Pluralism Revisited, supra note 41, at 356. 
130 E.g., Zoran Oklopcic, Provincialising Constitutional Pluralism, 5 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 
331, 336 (2014). 
131 Fassbender, supra note 2, at 574–575. 
132 Dupuy, supra note 2, at 20–24. 
133 Fassbender, supra note 2, at 574–576. 
134 Id. at 574 (claiming “growth” of “international peace and security” is controversial). 
135 Institutions, supra note 63, at 47. 
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the UNSC’s multi-faceted and broad role “does not allow us to speak of a true 
separation of powers in the” U.N.138 Treaty bodies and soft law organizations 
have different forms still.139 
Unlike in domestic constitutional orders, there also does not appear to be 
one authoritative interpreter of the Charter: the UNSC, UNGA, and ICJ all play 
interpretive roles.140 The ICJ then famously faces many limits on its jurisdiction 
and its review powers.141 The fact that there are many different fora to make the 
claims that are available and many existing international tribunals where claims 
are made are not subject to common constitutional constraints on adjudicators 
sourced in judicial independence further undermines the extent to which 
constitutional norms of domestic constitutionalism are realized in international 
law.142 Focusing on one interpreter could be helpful for understanding some 
phenomena, but questions about whether they serve the same role as domestic 
“equivalents” will remain. The fact that domestic courts look to other domestic 
courts to understand the content of international law suggests that domestic 
courts too play an interpretative role.143 Thus, this form of interpretation 
complicates the comparative enterprise regardless of whether it actually 
provides a good account of “international law” on its own terms.  
Fragmentation also disperses powers among many organizations. There is 
no clear hierarchy and some overlap between them. States show no interest in 
resisting fragmentation by giving particular organizations supremacy or creating 
a new system of organizations that integrates existing ones.144 Proponents of 
constitutionalism suggest an apex court is unlikely in this sphere; the functional 
constitutional order they promote instead will again likely lack the structural 
form of many domestic constitutions since the functionality they discuss is 
primarily goal-based.145 There is ultimately “no reason for arguing that the 
constitutional principles of international organizations should be similar to those 
known from the domestic context.”146 Again, spheres of international law may 
have their own hierarchies and rules and may provide insight into various 
normative phenomena, but they will importantly differ from domestic 
constitutional orders.  
 
C. FUTURE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS ARE LIKELY TO DIFFER 
FROM DOMESTIC EQUIVALENTS 
 
The forgoing structural issues may explain why scholars view the 
constitutionalization of international law as incomplete. The incompleteness of 
the international “constitutional” order provides reason not to compare that order 
with domestic constitutional ones, particularly in high stakes scenarios of 
 
 
 
138 Fassbender, supra note 2, at 576. 
139 Id. at 48–55. 
140 Sloan, supra note 2, at 73–74 (explaining that that similarly diffuse authoritative interpretations 
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judicial pronouncements. Incomplete constitutions should likely only be 
compared with each other. Comparison with an incomplete constitutional order 
that is not even obviously constitutional should be rare. An incomplete candidate 
constitution whose status remains controversial is unlikely to tell us much about 
constitutions generally. This may also explain why a leading proponent of the 
view that the Charter is a global constitution sometimes makes his claim 
metaphorical, rather than actual.147 The metaphor informs international law. 
Constitutional law is a given. The metaphor only makes sense when contrasted 
with that given. 
Unfortunately for some, there is also reason to suggest that future 
international constitutional orders will differ from current domestic ones and co-
development of the international and domestic that would warrant a norm of 
comparison is not taking place. Recall the distinction between the legal ordering 
and norm-diffusing senses of constitutionalization. It should now be clear that 
the constitutionalization of international law is not constitutionalization in the 
legal ordering sense. This may be apt if the primary aim of constitutionalization 
is spreading certain norms. Recall that the legal ordering sense of 
constitutionalization may not be the best method of realizing the norm-diffusing 
sense.148 The defects with the Charter and the order surrounding it outlined 
above are unlikely to be remedied in circumstances likely to arise soon. Klabbers 
granted that we likely will not ever have a formal global constitution in 2009.149 
Skepticism about universal binding norms has only grown since. While 
Fassbender argues that a global constitution is possible, he thinks that the ideal 
of such a constitution will break from its origins in comparison with domestic 
constitutions.150 This could produce something unlike (even future) domestic 
constitutions and so not a proper source of comparison in many circumstances. 
If we get some complete form of international constitutionalization in the 
future, it may help deal with fragmentation issues.151 But the output likely will 
not resemble constitutions in the domestic sphere. Klabbers, Peters, and Ulfstein 
establish that having the same “constitutional features” does not entail having 
the same constitutional structure. They state that the global constitution that will 
have these features will not be contained in a single document and will be 
“pluralist” in nature.152 Both features make possible global constitutions unlike 
many domestic constitutions. The pluralist criterion is more worrisome. 
Domestic constitutions allow for multi-sectoral coverage. Yet, even then, 
pluralism operates differently in domestic and international cases since 
international organizations affect member states. To the extent that domestic 
orders are becoming pluralist, international constitutionalization still differs and 
is far from being realized. It is still unclear whether an international 
constitutional legal order exists and it is now unclear whether the form that will 
 
 
 
147 Dupuy, supra note 2, at 30. 
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exist in the future will be an appropriate comparator in many cases since 
domestic pluralist constitutions are at best difficult to identify. The judicial 
comparison at issue is still rarely going to be licit since we will not be comparing 
things that are even developing similarly. Future licit comparison is also unlikely 
to be possible in at least high stakes scenarios where we cannot afford inapt 
comparison and the case for aptness cannot clearly be assumed. 
 
D. DOMESTIC LEGAL PRACTICE UNDERMINES THE CASE FOR COMPARISON 
 
Domestic courts’ role in the development of foreign and international law 
also differs in a way that suggests that the respective legal orders are distinct. A 
Canadian court can cite German law to examine how Canadian law should 
develop or as a source of common provenance. But Canadian judges have no 
special authority in German law and do not directly develop German law. 
Canadian courts do, however, apply international law. They are understood to 
have special knowledge of at least aspects of that law in a way that contributes 
to development of international law through interpretation of its national 
implications and as evidence of state practice that international courts use to 
establish parts of the law. Unfortunately, many courts’ comparative practices are 
sometimes problematically unsystematic.153 There is then good practical reason 
for judges not to involve international law in comparative judgments where such 
judgments could impact the development of international law: potential effects 
of poor comparison are greater where domestic courts impact the development 
of a third party (here international) legal system. 
The role of domestic courts in international law also provides further 
evidence of the lack of one authority on international law, making it more 
difficult to point to the body of international law that is the proper comparator. 
Comparative international law suggests that “international law” may not be one 
set of legal proscriptions with which one can compare one’s own system.154 This 
is, of course, a controversial claim—I myself am ambivalent about it—but the 
possibility that these domains cannot be adequately separated should provide 
ample reason for comparative caution.  
Fragmentation, in other words, may also undermine comparison insofar as 
the content of international law requires domestic courts to implement it. 
Domestic courts create international law and translate it into domestic law.155 
This could suggest that there is no standalone body of international law 
independent of domestic law with which domestic law can be compared. If 
international law is partly an aspect of domestic law even from the standpoint of 
international law, the most we can say is comparison of international law and 
constitutional law is like comparison between domestic tort law and 
constitutional law. Such a comparison would then be purely domestic and so not 
comparative law (constitutional or otherwise) in its classic or modern forms. 
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E. COMPARISON IN MONIST STATES MAY JUST BE APPLICATION OF 
DOMESTIC LAW 
 
The possibility of widespread apt comparison is further constrained by the 
reality that international law that has become a binding part of a state’s law will 
need to be applied directly and so cannot properly be part of a comparative 
analysis. Domestically too, then, there will often be a lack of independent 
existence of the domestic and international laws that one would like to compare. 
One can compare how the law operates in the international system with how it 
operates in the domestic system or one can compare how it operates in one’s 
domestic jurisdiction and another’s, but the former is likely illicit where the 
international law is truly binding since it would admit that one is refusing to 
apply binding law and the latter is a project in comparative domestic law or 
comparative international law rather than a comparison between the domestic 
and international laws. One can compare how the law operated in the 
international legal system with how it operates in the domestic system, but only 
the domestic sense is binding. Other reasons to question whether that 
comparison is going to be enlightening appear above. This may be a weak 
argument against comparison generally, but it does limit when judges especially 
can use it (if there is an independent international “constitutional” order with 
which comparison could be possible). 
 
F. THE CHARTER ALONE DOES NOT SUPPORT OVERLAP ARGUMENTS 
 
Independent of the strength of the preceding arguments against comparison, 
there is reason to question some arguments for comparison. These potential 
weaknesses further support caution in the use of international law as a 
comparator and undermine a default position that comparison is apt, especially 
in high stakes cases. Where these weaknesses suggest that the international and 
domestic constitutional projects differ, they also raise questions about the proper 
standards of comparison between them. The underlying tensions cannot be 
resolved by simply pointing to the standards of comparative “constitutional” law 
alone if the international is not truly constitutional. 
Consider the “overlap” in the Shared Project and Similarity Arguments. The 
Charter does not protect much of what we want constitutions to protect and what 
many constitutions do protect. It contains no explicit human rights 
obligations.156 It thus does not grant many of the rights that international law is 
often used to help explain.157 The similarity between the content of international 
human rights law and domestic constitutions that could ground a claim for the 
International Bill of Rights as a global constitution thus undermines the case for 
the Charter’s centrality. The Charter could combine with other documents to 
fulfill this role in a manner that may also support the Shared Project Argument 
above, but other candidate constitutional documents that could combine with it 
also present problems. For example, recall Gardbaum’s claim that the 
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International Bill of Rights has international constitutional status.158 Gardbaum 
identifies four similarities between international human rights and domestic 
constitutional rights: both (1) “perform the same basic function of stating limits 
on what governments may do in their jurisdiction,” (2) are roughly the same age, 
(3) have roughly the same content (viz., recognize roughly the same roster of 
rights (with exceptions in the ICESCR)), and (4) contain only a few peremptory 
norms with most being derogable and subject to limitation.159 Gardbaum does 
not provide much empirical support for (1)-(4). There is reason to question each. 
For instance, the functions of the “constitutions” and nature of the orders in 
which they operate differ greatly and substantial structural differences make the 
comparisons even in (perhaps counterfactual) cases where (4) is true less than 
ideal. Gardbaum himself identifies the non-binding status of the UDHR and the 
lack of enforcement of many international human rights or even quasi-
constitutional status for international bills of rights as clear limitations on 
recognizing international human rights as global constitutional rights.160 Given 
these problems, it is unlikely that the International Bill of Rights or the Charter 
can ground a Shared Content Argument either individually or combined. Any 
lingering differences need to be addressed when designing a comparative 
methodology for any licit comparisons between the spheres one may draw. 
 
G. THE SHARED PROJECT ARGUMENT HAS LIMITED APPLICATION 
 
Finally, the most plausible versions of the Shared Project Argument only 
grounds a few licit comparisons, undermining any claimed centrality for 
international law in comparative constitutional law. For instance, some domestic 
constitutions do contain the mix of peremptory and non-peremptory norms and 
limitation clauses distinctive of post-WWII international law,161 but this only 
warrants comparison in nations with those features. Differences between them 
and the pre-WWII nature of many parts of other constitutions undermine the 
general case for comparison. For instance, many domestic rights, including 
controversial ones, predate their international equivalents. Consider the pre-
World War II recognition of social rights in many Latin American nations.162 
Widespread domestic recognition of many rights is also not contemporaneous 
with international recognition. Domestic rates of recognition of many economic, 
social, and cultural rights did not grow substantially after their international 
recognition in the 1960s. Recognition is still missing in many nations. The extent 
to which mutual citation by domestic courts and the use of foreign law clerks is 
an instantiation of international legal norms is also open to debate. Some shared 
history between international human rights and many modern domestic 
constitutions may support the thesis that the respective legal orders are part of a 
common history. Nonetheless, even this only applies to some countries. 
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160 Id. at 751–752, 761. 
161 See sources in note 24. See also, e.g., Hirschl, supra note 26, at 239. Sujit Choudhry, After the 
Rights Revolution: Bills of Rights in the Post-Conflict State, 6 ANN. REV. of L. & SOC. SCI. 301 (2010); 
Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 707, 
747 (2012). 
162 JOHN TOBIN, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (2012). 
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Structural differences will again make this appeal problematic, and nations that 
explicitly link the projects by making international law part of their domestic 
laws then face the problem in (E). 
 
 
VI. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
 
The above should contribute to the understanding of the relationship 
between international law and comparative constitutional law and (at least) its 
implications for judicial practice. Objections linger. I will address three 
objections briefly before concluding with necessarily tentative remarks. First, 
one may object that the Charter is not the best candidate for the international 
constitution. A powerful line of argument states that the constitution of 
international human rights law is sufficiently similar to domestic constitutions 
to warrant comparison.163 Yet the forgoing demonstrated that the larger 
international order lacks constitutional features regardless of what document 
would serve as its constitution. Fragmentation and enforcement issues are 
particularly widespread. I also discussed limitations with using the International 
Bill of Rights as a constitution.164 Indeed, I actually think that it serves as the 
basis for a sub-system in which international human rights law operates as a 
closed normative order that can provide insight into important normative 
phenomena, but that sub-system still differs from domestic constitutional orders 
and its insights may not be directly importable to domestic legal decisions for 
several reasons outlined above. While I did not discuss the VCLT in detail, it is 
a treaty and thus likely lacks requisite constituent authority despite its formal 
status as the document that otherwise establishes the hierarchical ordering of 
constitutional law. I grant that jus cogens or erga omnes norms fulfill several 
criteria above, including hierarchy and bindingness. While I find them 
intuitively problematic as constitutions, whether they can be the basis of a global 
constitutional order would admittedly require more work elsewhere.165 
Second, one may argue that my criteria above are too demanding. 
Fassbender, for one, claims that the hierarchy of norms is a new feature of 
constitutions that began in the eighteenth century.166 However, I identified these 
criteria by consulting sources that claim that international law has something 
like a domestic constitution. This is dialectically fair. I think some combination 
of the criteria is plausible. The Charter and the system connected to it fails to 
 
 
 
163 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 751. 
164 The ICCPR also has too many reservations to qualify as global constitution; KLABBERS, PETERS 
& ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 23–25. 
165 Moreover, I suggested some reasons to question their ability to serve as the basis of a global 
constitutional order above. Similar problems with the Charter-based system likely apply to them. Truly 
jus cogens norms should already operate in domestic constitutions. Thus, the application of jus cogens in 
domestic law and their comparison to how they operate in the international legal system may not be apt 
where the system in which they operate differs from— and yet may not have independent existence 
from—domestic constitutional orders. Jus cogens norms may have some special moral status. Whether 
this warrants their use as the basis for a global constitutional order justifying widespread comparison 
between domestic and international phenomena is unclear. 
166 Fassbender, supra note 2, at 537. 
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fulfill the demands of any plausible combination. The hierarchy criterion is 
nonetheless important enough to require a response here. If hierarchy is not 
required, one may question whether a unity of laws is required. The case against 
comparison from fragmentation would then falter. Yet if even most modern 
constitutions have this feature and international law’s candidate constitution and 
the international legal order does not, this provides reason not to compare 
modern constitutions or constitutional orders and the international would-be 
equivalents. Some claims that domestic constitutions are becoming pluralistic 
notwithstanding,167 modern domestic constitutions that we see in most 
constitutional comparisons are hierarchical and unify laws. A demandingness 
objection sourced in practical considerations also misses the mark. There is 
admittedly a strong case to be made that appealing to international legal orders 
can produce good outcomes that will protect foundational constitutional 
norms.168 If successful, it provides practical reason to cite international law and 
may provide reason to do so comparatively. From this perspective, my limit may 
seem overdemanding: it makes it more difficult to protect important things. 
While I grant this, my primary interest is knowledge production and reasoned 
judgments. Suggested practical reasons for comparison will usually be defeated 
by the normative reasons above, especially given bad law’s practical disutility. 
Relatedly, third, and finally, one may argue that this makes judges unable to 
fulfill many of their important comparative tasks. An idealized picture of the 
field identifies (at least) nine goals of comparative constitutional analysis, 
including (a) curiosity, (b) legal tool identification and understanding, (c) 
understanding legal tool selection, (d) mapping the history of ideas, (e) theory 
building, (f) norm identification, (g) taxonomy, (h) harmonization, and (i) 
determining cases.169 Perhaps our comparison fulfills these aims? I take this 
objection most seriously. I must ultimately grant that international law has a role 
to play in comparative constitutional law. But the preceding does suggest that 
the nature of this role cannot be easily adduced, and that the role may be less 
central than many would expect. Where the international legal system appears 
inadequately constitutional, one should exercise caution when invoking 
international law for comparative constitutional law purposes. The preceding 
could admittedly be clearer on the specifics of what this requires. But a few 
implications do immediately present themselves. While I must be suggestive 
here due to space constraints, these implications are worth exploring further in 
other (methodological) works. 
One implication of the forgoing is that not all comparisons between 
international and domestic constitutional orders are likely to fulfill comparative 
constitutional law purposes and that even some licit comparisons between the 
orders that could fulfill those purposes may not actually be best understood as 
comparative constitutional law properly-so-called. The preceding does not entail 
 
 
 
167 See infra Part V(C).  
168 Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 766. 
169 This amalgam of categories in methodological works above is defended in Michael Da Silva, 
Methodological Pluralism and the Methods of Comparative Constitutional Law, 2 INT’L COMP., POL’Y 
& ETHICS L. REV. 631 (2019). I also discuss how to combine methods and purposes in that work. The 
preceding offers some considerations on why international law may not be a good source to input into 
any method. This does not mean that it cannot fulfill the purposes, but the method of doing so may not 
be a comparative constitutional one. 
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that all comparisons between international law and constitutional law are 
inappropriate. Comparison may be necessary to determine whether international 
law has constitutional features. Even the question that animates this work 
requires some comparison. It is, moreover, worth exploring whether any 
mainstream existing comparative constitutional law projects can still use 
international law as a source of analysis. Indeed, I suspect that there are many 
ways in which comparison could be useful. The international and domestic 
constitutional systems do face common problems and contain some similar, if 
not identical, concepts.170 Some constitutional phenomena are meant to directly 
incorporate or mirror international legal phenomena.171 International law is 
accordingly clearly relevant for understanding what legal tools are available to 
address different issues and for understanding the history of some legal ideas, if 
not an underlying theory of what the concepts are supposed to mean. Where 
there is direct borrowing of international legal concepts in the domestic sphere, 
international law is plausibly necessary for understanding the relevant 
constitutional norm.  
One should accordingly not take the preceding words of caution as 
suggesting more than they do: I propose that the presumption that comparison is 
apt is undermotivated and that not all forms of comparison qualify as 
comparative constitutional analysis. That suggestion is far from assuming that 
comparison between the spheres is always illicit or even that international legal 
phenomena are irrelevant to some of the traditional tasks of comparative 
constitutional legal analysis. But assumptions to the contrary now appear equally 
problematic. If the international system is not constitutional, then its ability to 
shed light on constitutional concerns can no longer be taken for granted. The 
onus should instead be on those who seek to explain why non-constitutional 
phenomena are relevant comparators apt to provide insight into constitutional 
phenomena and fulfill relevant purposes. This alone is a methodologically 
important finding. Yet the forgoing concerns about the constitutionality of 
international law and international law’s implications in the domestic 
constitutional realities of many states further suggest that assumptions that any 
such comparisons are best understood as exercises in comparative constitutional 
law are also questionable and require reconsideration. This has implications not 
only for our understanding of the constitutionality of the international legal order 
but for our understanding of the contours of comparative constitutional law. 
Comparative constitutional law is now severable from international law. Its 
textbooks should accordingly focus primarily on domestic constitutions—or 
perhaps regional ones—and should admit the international legal order only as a 
peripheral case. This skepticism further provides reason to question whether the 
norms of comparative constitutional law apply to comparisons between the 
international and domestic constitutional spheres or if some other set of norms 
 
 
 
170 For a particularly strong analysis of this point, see Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for 
States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009). Goldsmith 
and Levinson suggest that these commonalities make international law more like constitutional law than 
ordinary domestic law. Even if this is so, however, its being a better comparator than another does not 
make it a generally apt one. 
171 Consider, e.g., the influence of international human rights law on many domestic constitutions 
motivating the Shared Project Argument. Several sources above, including those in notes 24 and 161, are 
relevant here. 
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are necessary. Giving up on many assumptions tied to the constitutionality of 
the international legal order opens many new and important research paths at the 
same time that they foreclose easy access to simple comparisons. 
Finally, returning to my central case, the preceding offers some evidence 
that judicial use of such comparison should still be limited at best. The stakes of 
judicial determinations are too high to determine constitutional cases based on 
comparison between the international and domestic. Few other purposes are 
within the domain of the judiciary. Many within their domain are not in it in a 
way that allows comparison. Judges particularly should not be seeking 
comparison for the sake of curiosity and taxonomy. Identifying patterns of use 
of legal tools is irrelevant to domestic decision-making of most forms and judges 
should not compare to identify legal tools, since the only legal tools they have 
are the rules of reasoning and remedial rules in their domain. Appealing to 
international law will be apt for understanding international legal tools and 
understanding the history of ideas, but this will rarely be helpful for deciding 
cases on domestic legal phenomena absent the historical and functional links 
required to get to such a high stakes scenario. Even when judges look to other 
jurisdictions to establish that foreign phenomena could work in a jurisdiction to, 
for instance, help establish whether a limitation on a derogable right is justified, 
they must appeal to jurisdictions that are similar enough to allow us to say they 
could work here.172 The international order is too different from domestic ones 
to allow this. Judges can harmonize constitutional and international laws only 
when they have the authority to do so. Use of this authority will often lead to 
application of international law. A lack of authority may bar comparison. 
Comparison may be helpful for theory-building, but legal theories that can 
resolve cases may not give international law special support absent clear links 
between the international and domestic spheres that either make the analysis 
purely domestic or establish that we are in a case where the Shared Project 
Argument applies and international law does not apply domestically. It should 
be clear, for instance, that international human rights law particularly reflects 
the considered (if politicized) judgments of intelligent people on what certain 
concepts should include. This does not provide it with special moral authority 
over other regimes that ought to be recognized as a matter of law. Using 
international human rights law as a legal source, especially as a source for 
comparative law, is different. Given the preceding, we may question whether we 
should use it for legal purposes. At minimum, a sense of caution is clearly 
needed. While one may question whether so much ink needed to be spilled to 
get to this point, a simple reminder of this fact has clear value. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The best candidate for an international constitution lacks core constitutional 
features and the larger international legal order lacks core features of domestic 
constitutional orders. These structural differences mean that there is no 
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international constitutional law that is sufficiently similar to domestic 
constitutional laws to warrant comparison that reliably provides new 
information about constitutional phenomena. International law may lack 
independent existence from domestic law that would allow it to serve as a basis 
of true comparison and many licit forms of would-be comparison are ultimately 
just applications of domestic law. One should accordingly take care when 
conducting comparisons between the international and domestic constitutional 
spheres and should recognize that licit comparison is not best described as 
comparative constitutional law but another interpretive exercise subject to its 
own norms of conduct. Viewing comparisons between international and 
domestic constitutional law as a form of comparative constitutional law 
misunderstands the relevant legal spheres and relationship(s) between them.  
